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Rationality and Theistic Belief, by Mark S. McLeod. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993. Pp. xiv and 260. $37.50 (cloth).
DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Seattle Pacific University
Many Christians say that, on occasion, God manifests Himself to them as
doing something, e.g. guiding, forgiving, or strengthening them, or being
something, e.g. wise, powerful or loving. They often describe their experiences in much the way we ordinarily describe our perception of nearby
physical objects. They don't infer that God best explains their experience, nor
do they indicate that they are merely indirectly aware of Him, say, through
the words of a friend or by viewing a majestic mountain. Rather, they take it
that they directly perceive Him, that God directly appears thus-and-so. Their
description of their experiences leads one to wonder whether such (putative)
perception of God can justify such beliefs about Him (call them "M-beliefs")
in the way in which we ordinarily think that (putative) perception of physical objects in normal circumstances can justify hum-drum perceptual beliefs.
William Alston has recently argued that this is indeed the case. Suppose he's
right. One might go on to claim that M-beliefs are as strongly justified as perceptual beliefs. Call this latter claim the parity thesis.
With the early Alston, let's say that S's belief that x is F is justified (in the
"weak normative" sense, Jnw ) on the basis of (putative) direct awareness
of x as F if, and only if, S does not have sufficient reason to believe that S's
belief that x is F was unreliably produced. Then, one version of the parity
thesis is this:
PT. We have no better reason to believe that S's M-beliefs are unreliably formed than we have to believe that S's hum-drum perceptual beliefs are unreliably formed.
Alston thinks about belief formation in terms of a "doxastic practice," a
family of ways of going from grounds, experiential and doxastic, to beliefs
with a certain content. Questions of individuation aside, suppose there is a
practice of going from sensory experience to hum-drum perceptual beliefs,
i.e., a practice of objectifying sensory experience in. terms of discrete, persisting objects occupying a three-dimensional space, call it SP. And let's say
there is a practice of moving from what many Christians take to be direct
awareness of God to beliefs about Him, i.e., a practice of objectifying such
experiences in distinctively Christian terms, call it CPo Thus, whether PT is
true is, in Alston's terms, a question of whether we have better reason to
believe CP is unreliable than we have to believe SP is unreliable.
In Rationality and Theistic Belief, Mark McLeod aims, in large part, to
argue that any version of the parity thesis attributable to Alston is false
since each one fails to recognize the role of background beliefs in the formation and justification of M-beliefs. Applied to PT, McLeod's "background
belief challenge" is this: We can identify x by way of directly experiencing it
if, and only if, there is some property P such that x has P, P cannot be had
by any being other than x, and P can be part of the "phenomenological content" of our experience. Now, for any property P such that the Christian
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God has P, either P can be had by some being other than Him or P cannot
be part of the phenomenological content of our experience. So, we cannot
identify the Christian God by way of directly experiencing Him. To do that
we must use distinctively Christian beliefs (not just concepts) to read into
our experience that it is as an experience of the Christian God. We can, however, identify physical objects by way of directly experiencing them. Take
Suzie's house for example. While it has many properties that other things
have, what makes it unique is that those properties have a specific spatiotemporallocation. Suzie's house has the unique property of being a pink,
shuttered, ... bungalow at Fourth and Main. Of course, "that I am in one
neighborhood rather than another, on one street rather than another, is
given directly in experience"; it is part of the phenomenological content of
my experience. That's because the "spatial information that picks out where
I am vis-a-vis the local geography (this neighborhood or that street)" "is part
of the conceptual scheme I bring to the experience. I objectify the experience
as Suzie's house - the pink, shuttered bungalow at Fourth and Main." I
don't use beliefs about my local whereabouts to read into my experience
that it is an experience of a pink, shuttered,. .. bungalow at Fourth and Main.
Thus, we can identify a physical object by way of directly experiencing it,
without using background beliefs in the way background beliefs are used to
identify God as the object of religious experience. This difference between
CP and SP - the fact that forming M-beliefs, but not hum-drum perceptual
beliefs, involves at least a noninferential role for background beliefs - is reason to believe PT false. Here's why. First, complexity. A belief whose formation involves a noninferential role for background beliefs is more likely to
be false since there are more complicated intellectual moves in its formation,
"there's more room for slip-ups or mistakes." Second, arbitrariness.
Distinctively Christian background beliefs enable one to identify what they
are experiencing as the Christian God rather than some other god. Without
them, one's experience has no more content than "a (more or less) vague
sense of a reality beyond the merely physical or even the merely (humanly)
personal." Thus, if those who form M-beliefs are to avoid arbitrarily reading
Christian theology into their experience, their distinctively Christian background beliefs need justification. As such, we have reason to believe that CP
is less trustworthy than SP.
What should we make of McLeod's background belief challenge to PT?
There are several mistakes and oversights. Here are five.
1. For starters, Alston never ever affirmed any version of the parity thesis.
He explicitly denies it in Perceiving God, and even in his earlier writings he
never says or implies that the degree of justification that attends M-beliefs
(or the degree of rationality that attends engagement in CP) is just as
strong as the degree of justification that attends hum-drum perceptual
beliefs (or the degree of rationality that attends engagement in SP). At
most, Alston implies that there is a common structure of justification, or
that the same sort of justification enjoyed by hum-drum perceptual beliefs
is enjoyed by M-beliefs under certain conditions, or that we have no good
reason to deny either of these things.
2. How much less justified are M-beliefs than hum-drum perceptual
beliefs? McLeod doesn't say. For all he argues, the fact that M-belief forma-

BOOK REVIEWS

439

tion involves a noninferential role for background beliefs is, in itself, epistemically negligible, resulting in, say, the difference between being justified
in believing that I am eating bran flakes now and being justified in believing that I ate bran flakes a few minutes ago. One is left puzzled: where's
the punch behind the "challenge"?
3. Suppose that M-belief formation involves a non inferential role for
background beliefs but perceptual belief formation does not. And suppose
that, all else being equal, this fact suffices to show PT false. Is all else equal?
McLeod doesn't say. For all he argues, there may be respects in which perceptual beliefs are justificatorily inferior to M-beliefs (reasons to think SP is
unreliable that do not apply to CP); if there are, then, for all McLeod
argues, PT is true.
4. Suppose the background beliefs I use to form M-beliefs are maximally
Jnw for me: I haven't the slightest bit of reason to think they are unreliably
produced. Why, then, aren't my M-beliefs at least as Jnw as my perceptual
beliefs, even though my M-beliefs depend on background beliefs for their
generation and justification and perceptual beliefs do not? McLeod says the
sheer fact that background beliefs are involved in their formation renders Mbeliefs less reliably produced than perceptual beliefs. Here his points about
complexity and arbitrariness enter. What should we make of them?
The point about complexity assumes that if x is a more complex cognitive process than y, then x is likely to be less reliable and trustworthy than
y. McLeod thinks this is obvious. But it isn't.
Let's think about the matter briefly. Suppose I'm in the Kingdome
watching Ken Griffey, Jr. play baseball. I'm directly aware of him slamming a home run, catching a fly ball, etc. Now compare this with another
case. Suppose I'm watching a live broadcast of the game on NBC. I'm
aware of him hitting a home run in virtue of being aware of the television.
My belief that Griffey just hit a home run is the product of a more complex
process in the case of indirect rather than direct awareness. Is that sufficient
reason to suppose that it is more likely that my belief is false in the indirect
case as opposed to the direct case? I can't tell. The additional complexity
looks epistemically negligible. Of course, we can think of cases in which
complexity does affect reliability, e.g., long versus short division. But note
that in such cases experience has taught us that it is more likely that we
will make a mistake using the more complex process. These reflections
reveal two questions relevant to discerning whether, in any particular pair
of cases, we have reason to think that the more complex cognitive process
is likely to be less reliable than the simpler. How much more complex is x
than y? Do we have a comparative record of success and failure? If x is
only marginally more complex than y, then, lacking reason to be suspicious, we should not infer that x is more likely to be unreliable. On the
other hand, if we have no reason at all to think that the additional complexity of some particular process x makes it less reliable than y, then we
should not suppose otherwise. Perhaps experimental pscyhology has
something to say about complexity and reliability.
What about the arbitrariness point? It does nothing to show that CP is
less reliable than SP. The use of Christian background beliefs in the formation of M-beliefs is objectionably arbitrary only if those background beliefs
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are unjustified, and McLeod gives us no reason to think they are unjustified.
The situation here is this: McLeod relies heavily on the premise that due
to the role of background beliefs in their formation, M-beliefs are not as
strongly justified as perceptual beliefs. Both of his arguments for it are
underdeveloped.
5. McLeod says that forming M-beliefs must involve at least a noninferential role for Christian background beliefs. Unless one's experience is
informed by Christian theology, the content of one's experience cannot be,
phenomenologically speaking, distinctively Christian. No doubt, Christian
theology can, and sometimes does, play this role. But why suppose it must?
Because "there is nothing in the phenomenological aspect of the experience
alone that entitles the perceiver to claim that it is an experience of [the
Christian] God" rather than some other god. And that's because we are
able to identify x by way of directly experiencing it if, and only if, there is
some property P such that x has P, P cannot be had by any being other
than x, and P can be part of the "phenomenological content" of our experience (call this McLeod's principle of perceptual identification); but God has no
such property since "the mere appearance of god-like features always
leaves one with doubts, or possible grounds for doubt, as to the identity of
the object of experience." Thus, the content of one's experience can be distinctively Christian only if one uses distinctively Christian beliefs to interpret one's religious experience.
At least three lines of response come to mind.
Response 1. We must distinguish two matters: what the phenomenological content of one's (putative) experience of God is and what the epistemic
status of one's M-belief is. Phenomenological description is not epistemology. Even if nothing in the phenomenological content of the experience entitles one's M-belief or relieves one of all doubt, that content may still be,
phenomenologically speaking, of the Christian God. So it does not follow
that distinctively Christian background beliefs must be used in order for
the phenomenological content to be of the Christian God. McLeod's argument is a non-sequitur. (Note: I have not here challenged McLeod's principle of perceptual identification.)
Response 2. Let us continue to suppose with McLeod that we can identify
the Christian God by way of direct awareness if, and only if, He has some
uniquely instantiable property which can appear in the phenomenological
content uf our experience. Why should we suppose that being God the
Father or being Christ isn't one of them? The property of being God the
Father - that person - cannot be had by anyone else. McLeod will insist
that one cannot be sure that the non-phenomenal object of the experience
was in fact what one takes it to be. But, again: this worry is completely
irrelevant to the question of whether the phenomenological content of
one's experience can be, e.g., of Christ without one's Christian background
beliefs being used to form that content.
In short, then, we might accept McLeod's principle of perceptual identification, say that part of the phenomenological content of distinctively
Christian experience is that it is, irreducibly, of God the Father or of Christ,
and note that being God the Father or being Christ are properties uniquely
instantiable.
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Response 3. Since the position sketched in Response 2 is false,
McLeod's principle of perceptual identification is false, at least if we can
identify any individual by way of experience. Suppose, for conditional
proof, that I can identify Suzie's house by way of experience. Now suppose, for reductio, that McLeod's principle is true, hence that I can identify Suzie's house by way of experience only if Suzie's house has some
uniquely instantiable property P that can appear in the phenomenological content of my experience. Every property that Suzie's house has is
such that either (i) it is possible that some other object have it or (ii) it
cannot appear in the phenomenological content of my experience. So, I
cannot identify Suzie's house by way of experience, which contradicts
our initial supposition. Thus, if I can identify Suzie's house by way of
experience, then McLeod's principle is false.
What should we make of the premise that every property that Suzie's
house has is such that either (i) it is possible that some other object have it
or (ii) it cannot appear in the phenomenological content of my experience?
McLeod asserts that spatio-temporallocation can be part of the phenomenological content of experience. Well, suppose it can. Still, there is a possible world in which there is a house that is qualitatively, but not numerically, identical with Suzie's house and that occupies all and only the spatiotemporal points that Suzie's house in fact occupies. So, contrary to what
McLeod says, it is possible that some other object has the property of being
a pink, shuttered, ... bungalow at Fourth and Main. Might some other
uniquely instantiable property of Suzie's house possibly appear in the phenomenological content of experience? Friends of Response 2 will say "yes."
I know of no other plausible candidate.
Here's another argument. The sort of properties that can appear in the
phenomenological content of experience are qualitative properties. But the
sort of properties which it is not possible for some other object to have are
non-qualitative, say, a haecceity. So, every property of an object, and hence
Suzie's house, is such that either (D it is possible that some other object have
it or (ii) it cannot appear in the phenomenological content of my experience.
I fear I may leave the impression that McLeod only writes about (putative) parity theses attributable to Alston. This is not the case. McLeod
applies the background belief challenge to (putative) parity theses attributable to Plantinga, unsuccessfully, I think. Also against Plantinga "the
Universality Challenge" is developed, which hangs on the (false) claim that
S's belief that p is properly basic only if the nontheistic experience that generates it is such that, if a fully rational person Thad S's experience, T
would believe that p. (One can be fully rational yet defective in other ways
that prevent one from believing p.) Finally, McLeod develops in an interesting but frequently unclear fashion what he calls "the new parity" thesis
(which isn't new): beliefs about God are just as rational as beliefs about
human persons. In the end, I can't see why the new parity thesis is any better off than others, e.g. PT.
The view that background beliefs playa significant epistemic role in
the formation of M-beliefs but not hum-drum perceptual beliefs is worthy of reflection and research. And the view that the epistemology of Mbeliefs is more fruitfully compared to the epistemology of beliefs about
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other human persons than nonhuman physical objects is promising. I
hope someone will soon do a good job of defending them.!
NOTES
1. For helpful comments on earlier drafts I am grateful to Frances
Howard-Snyder.

The Problem of Hell, by Jonathan L. Kvanvig. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993. Pp.viii and 182. $24.95 (cloth).
FRANCES HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington University
An instance of the problem of evil, the problem of hell is particularly troubling for theism, since hell is a terrible thing, the worst thing that can happen to anyone, and unlike other kinds of suffering, one for which the sufferer cannot be compensated in the long run. Why would a perfectly loving
God permit people to suffer such evil? Why indeed would He condemn
them to it? Jonathan Kvanvig explores the tension between hell and any
form of theism which conceives of God as perfectly good. But he discusses
the problem primarily from the point of view of Christianity. He motivates
the problem by describing and rejecting a number of traditional accounts of
hell. In the latter half of the book he offers an account of his own and
attempts to show that it avoids the difficulties that faced the other accounts.
He begins by discussing the 'strong view' of hell. This, he believes, is the
standard view of hell, although he believes that scripture neither explicitly
endorses it nor entails it. The strong view has four components:
(H1) The Anti-Universalism Thesis: Some persons are consigned
to hell;
(H2) The Existence Thesis: Hell is a place where people exist, if
they are consigned there;
(H3) The No Escape Thesis: There is no possibility of leaving hell
and nothing one can do to change, or become in order to get out of
hell, once one is consigned there; and
(H4) The Retribution Thesis: The justification for hell is retributive
in nature, hell being constituted to mete out punishment to those
whose earthly lives and behavior warrant it. [19]
Interestingly, this list doesn't mention the fact that hell is unpleasant or otherwise bad. Perhaps that is too obvious to need mentioning. He also
assumes, but doesn't include here, that all human beings deserve hell. This
claim makes trouble for the strong view, but he doesn't consider rejecting it.
He discusses two versions of the strong view. The first (the 'equal punishment version') claims that all sinners receive the same punishment; the second (the 'differential punishment version') that, although all sinners receive
everlasting punishment, some are made to suffer worse than others. He criticizes the first as being both unfair and unjust, "unfair, because not everyone
is equally guilty; unjust, because not all sin, if any, deserves an infinite pun-

